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In this paper, we develop a simple game-theoretic model to explore the relationship 
between management of common pool resources used as an input in livestock production 
(common pastures) and the adoption of inputs associated with intensified per animal production 
(veterinary services, purchased fodder, feed concentrates, etc.).  Theoretically, it is shown that 
better managed pastures should lead to increased adoption of complementary inputs but decrease 
adoption of substitute inputs; impacts on stock levels, however, are ambiguous.  An empirical 
model is developed and applied to data collected in northeast Burkina Faso in 2000 and 2002.  
Results indicate that better managed pastures, proxied by community-level cooperative capacity 
indices, are indeed associated with lower purchases of substitute goods, e.g. purchases of low-
value feeds and greater purchases of complementary inputs, e.g. high-quality feeds.  However, 
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1.  BACKGROUND 
Burkina Faso is an agro-pastoral Sahelian country, where livestock production has always 
been an important component of agricultural activity.  However, a number of factors led to a 
decline in livestock activity through the 1970￿s and particularly the 1980￿s.   These included 
major droughts of the 1970￿s and 1980￿s, which induced estimated large losses of livestock, the 
importation of ￿cheap￿ livestock products from the European Union during the same period 
(ECA 2000), and an overvalued exchange rate. However, the 1990￿s have seen conditions 
improve for livestock producers because of a reversal of all three factors: the currency (F CFA) 
was devalued in 1994 leading to a 78 percent increase in producer prices for live animals 
between 1993 and 1996 (ECA 2000), rainfall has generally been more favorable, and anti-
dumping restrictions have reduced importation of unfairly priced livestock products from the 
EU. The contribution of livestock products to GDP is currently about 12 percent, and these 
products also account for 25 percent of export income. In fact, it is the second most important 
source of export income (24 percent) after cotton (IMF
2).  
In the drier northern regions, livestock production is based on extensive and semi-
extensive systems where access to common grazing lands and transhumance is heavily relied 
upon to provide forage resources.  In such systems, there is wide scope for collective action and 
cooperation to influence land use and allocation patterns, resource management, investments in 
                                                 








and maintenance of community resources, and thus household incomes and wellbeing.  In this 
paper, we consider the relationship between management of common pastures and household-
level decisions to intensify livestock production at the household level ￿ e.g. purchases of feeds, 
agro-industrial by-products, and veterinary services.    
An analysis of the role of collective action and its impact on household production and 
income strategies is very timely to the situation in Burkina Faso.  Surveys were undertaken in 
2000, subsequently in 2002, the government began a process of implementing new rural land 
laws previously languishing on the books.  Though the law itself is somewhat vague about 
practicalities involved in implementation, the goal is to decentralize responsibility for resource 
management￿ and hopefully authority and fiscal resources ￿ to the community, and where 
relevant, supra-community levels.  Unfortunately, this process got under way the year after the 
dataset used in this analysis was collected.  Nonetheless, in this context of decentralization and 
devolution -- a context characteristic of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa -- an analysis of 
the intensification decision is required if effective programs and policies are to be designed and 
implemented that subsequently enable smallholders to take advantage of expanding markets for 
livestock products, and not be ￿left behind￿.  
In the remainder of the paper, we first develop a simple-game theoretic model of the joint 
household decision on purchased inputs and the number of livestock to hold given that animals 
graze common pastures, under two assumptions:  1) a non-cooperative game is played over the 
use of common pastures, and 2) users jointly maximize total returns.  These two assumptions 
generate different outcomes, and this difference defines the set of pareto-improving outcomes 
possible with effective collective action.  Thus, we conclude this section by discussing the 




results of an analysis of community-level cooperative capacity for the communities where study 
households reside.  In section 3, we present the empirical model to be estimated, consider 
econometric issues, and present econometric results of the household-level decisions on livestock 
holdings and purchases of feed, agro-industrial by-products and vaccines.  The final section 
gives concluding observations. 
 
2.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
As discussed above, livestock owners make decisions on the purchase of inputs, in 
addition to the amount of stock to graze on common pastures.  The industrial organization 
literature has considered similar problems; theoretically, the common pool resource problem, 
where average product is a function of total extraction rates, is akin to the duopoly quantity 
choice market where demand is a function of total output.  Bulow et al. (1985) present a model 
where one firm produces outputs for two markets, costs of production of the two outputs are 
inter-related, and the firm is a monopolist in one market but a duopolist in the other.  Using 
definitions found in Bulow et al. (1985) and Mas-Collel et al. (1995), conventional substitutes 
(complements) are defined by the cases where a ￿more aggressive￿ strategy by firm A increases 
or decreases (increases) firm B￿s profits.  In our case, negative externalities arising from the use 
of the common pasture guarantee that the inputs are conventional complements.  However, if two 
outputs are strategic complements (substitutes), then the marginal profits of one firm decrease as 
the output of the other firm decreases (increases).   If marginal profits to selling in the first 
market decline due to an expansion of the second firm in the second market, then less will be 




inputs decline as others￿ increase their herd sizes grazing common pastures, then purchased 
inputs and others￿ livestock holdings are strategic substitutes. 
With respect to use of a common pool resource, Lopez (1998) develops a general model 
of agricultural intensification, where households choose to allocate labor and/or land to either 
labor-intensive or land-intensive agricultural outputs, though the author essentially assumes open 
access (so that average revenue product is equated to marginal costs in equilibrium).  Results 
indicate that exogenous parameter changes that favor labor-intensive production (e.g. an increase 
in relative price) increases labor-intensive production and reduces land-intensive production.  
Similarly, McCarthy et al. (1998) examine the case where producers can either allocate land to 
private crops or common pastures and also decide the stock densities on common pastures.  In 
this case, any parameter change that increases overstocking on common pastures reduces 
marginal product to land allocated to pasture and thus lands are re-allocated to private crops, 
meaning that stock levels are higher and land allocated to common property lower than under 
joint maximization.   
In this paper, we extend the general the theoretical models discussed above by developing 
a model of a two-player game where players￿ each simultaneously choose two input levels, 
allowing for inputs to be either traditional complements or substitutes in production (for the two-










3, but strategic 
substitutes, using Bulow et al. (1985) terminology, which captures the negative externality 









).  We also compare outcomes from the 
non-cooperative game with those arising from joint-maximization.  The latter is necessary so that 
                                                 




we can evaluate the potential impact of cooperation on outcomes.  In the context of management 
and use of common pool resources, many observers have noted that there is often evidence of 
some degree of cooperation leading to outcomes somewhere in between non-cooperation and 
joint-maximization (c.f. Baland and Platteau 1996; McCarthy et al. 1998). 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
Many of the game-theoretic analyses to date have continued to focus on production 
functions with one variable input used to exploit a fixed common resource (but c.f. Lopez 1996 
and McCarthy et al. 1998).  Here, we consider the case with two variable inputs, and one fixed 
common pasture.  
Consider the profit function,  ,, ;, ii i i j k i x i
ij




⎝⎠ ∑ , where output price is 
normalized to 1,  i k  is the variable input of the i￿th player, the use of which does not affect 
others￿ profits,  i x  is a variable input whose use does affect others￿ profits,  j x  is variable inputs 
used by the j-th player, P is the fixed pasture resource, and Z is a vector of both household- and 
community level characteristics that affect the profitability of livestock production, and  k c  and 
x c  are the unit costs of the two variable inputs, respectively.   Essentially, we can think of  i k  as 
purchased feeds or veterinary inputs, and  i x  as livestock.   
















































































.  These conditions ensure that there is a negative 




function is quasi-concave.  Suppressing fixed pasture resources and household and community 
characteristics in the production function, each individual maximizes the following: 
, max , , ;
ii
ii i i j k i x i kx
ij




⎝⎠ ∑  
which results in the following first order conditions (FOCs): 
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and similarly for each player. 
Next consider the social optimizer￿s problem, which given that agent￿s are homogenous, 
is the same as joint-maximization.  This is written as follows: 
, max , , ;
ii
ii i i j k i x i kx
ij
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This yields the following FOCs: 
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Comparing the derivatives with respect to i x  for the individual vs. the social optimizer 
(comparing equations [1] and [3]), we immediately note that [1]>[3] when evaluated at the same 








.   In other words, the following holds when evaluating the FOC￿s at the 













where SO and NC in the superscript refer to the inputs resulting under the social optimum and 
non-cooperative game, respectively.   
In order to evaluate the comparison between non-cooperative outcomes and joint 
maximization, we need to consider additional assumptions on whether or not private inputs and 
livestock levels are traditional gross complements or substitutes and whether or not they are 
strategic complements or substitutes.  Given that we assume that there is a negative externality 










, then player i￿s stock levels and player j￿s stock 
levels are always strategic substitutes ￿ increasing total stock levels on the commons reduces the 





















purchased inputs are traditional complements with own stock levels, but other players stock 
levels are strategic substitutes for player i￿s purchased inputs.    Essentially, this means that 
whenever the marginal product of cattle grazing commons increases, the marginal impact of 

























, imply that marginal product of livestock increases as 
externalities increase, and thus that the marginal product of purchased inputs increase. 
In the first scenario, we consider equilibrium outcomes when we assume that 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
>= <  and 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
<= < ; this captures the cases where the 
marginal product of the private variable input is reduced by both over-use and under-use of the 
common resource; we consider the case where 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
<= ≥  at the end of the 
section.   First, we evaluate whether 
NC SO
ii x x >  and 
NC SO
jj x x > ∑ ∑ is possible.  Greater input 
levels on the common resource reduces  1
NC
x FOC , as required.     And, given 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
>= < , then  11
NC SO
kk FOC FOC <  when evaluated at the pair: 
NC SO
ii x x > , 
NC SO
ii kk = .   This implies that 
NC SO
ii kk <  to ensure that  11
NC SO
kk FOC FOC = .  With 
NC SO
ii kk <  
1
NC
x FOC  is further reduced, so that the combination 
NC SO
ii x x > , 
NC SO
ii kk <  is possible.    
Next, we evaluate whether 
NC SO
ii x x <  and 
NC SO
jj x x < ∑ ∑  is possible.  In this case, 
1
NC
x FOC  increases still further; meaning that 
NC SO
ii kk <  would be required in order to equate the 
first-order conditions.   Since 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
>= <  at 
NC SO
ii kk = , this would require 
NC SO
ii kk < , which is consistent with the required change in  1
NC
x FOC .   
In both cases, 
NC SO
ii kk < , but 
NC SO
ii x x <=> .  The impact on stock densities is ambiguous, 
and depends on the marginal impact of over- or under-use on the marginal product of livestock 
vs. the marginal impact of purchased inputs.  Whenever the marginal impact of externalities on 




be higher and input levels will be lower under non-cooperation.  Finally, if there are no 
possibilities of under-use, e.g. 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
<= ≥ , then the only equilibrium 
combination is 
NC SO
ii kk < , 
NC SO
ii x x > . 
In the second scenario, we assume that the individual￿s livestock and his purchased inputs 
are gross substitutes and that 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
>= >  and 
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
<= > , 
which captures the cases where both over- and under-use of the commons increases the marginal 
product of the private variable input.  Following the process developed above, it is 
straightforward to show that 
NC SO
ii kk >  and 
NC SO
ii x x >  or 
NC SO
ii x x < are the only possible 
equilibrium combinations.  Again, if the impact of externalities generated from grazing common 
pastures has a greater impact on the marginal product of livestock versus the marginal product of 
purchased inputs, then 
NC SO
ii x x > , 
NC SO
ii kk >  will result.  And, if  
11 11
11 NC SO NC SO kk xx xx FOC FOC
<= ≤ , 
then the only 
NC SO
ii kk >  and 
NC SO
ii x x >  is possible.  
Summarizing the results, when outcomes lead to lower marginal returns on the pastures 
(either over- or under-grazing), use of inputs that are ￿traditional￿ gross complements in 
production ￿ i.e.  those that are gross complements when all inputs are private ￿ will be lower 
than the corresponding equilibrium under the social optimum.  We expect, then, that purchase of 
inputs such as vaccines, feed concentrates, and high value agro-industrial by-products will be 
lower where stock densities on pastures do not coincide with the social optimum, all else equal.  
On the other hand, bulky low-value feeds such as hay and stover may well substitute for misuse 
of common pastures, and so we would expect that purchase of such inputs increases. 
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We have introduced a new term, Coop , which captures the extent to which community 
members can engage in collective action and manage use rates on the commons in order to attain 
outcomes closer to, or equal to, those obtaining from joint-maximization.  We discuss our 
empirical strategy for measuring Coop below.   
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To test model hypotheses, data were collected at a number of different levels ￿ market, 
community, institutions, and household level.  Surveys were undertaken for 48 communities and 
400 households located in northeastern Burkina Faso.   The inputs to be estimated below include 
size of the household￿s livestock herd, measured in tropical livestock units (TLU), and the total 
number of cattle held.  We also estimate household purchases of millet and sorghum residues and 
grains, which is an adjusted aggregate quantity.   The sale unit of millet and sorghum stalks was 
in ￿bottes￿, which weighs roughly 5 kgs
4; units of grain were in kgs.  Using a conversion figure 
of 5 kg. of stover = 3 kg. of grain, we added the four types of purchased feed to get a total 
quantity in grain equivalents.  We expect that purchased crop residues and grain are substitutes 
for grazing pastures
5.  We also estimate the quantities of high-valued feed purchased and whether 
                                                 
4 Though we did not weigh purchased ￿bottes￿, team members assessed that the botte sizes were roughly uniform 
and that they weighed approximately 5 kgs., similar to a study undertaken by IITA in West Africa, c.f. 
www.iita.org/info/crop-livestock/arti18.pdf. 
5 Residues and grain themselves have different nutrition and caloric attributes, and grain in particular, may be a 
complement to residues and pasture.  We nonetheless consider both types of crop by-products as relatively low-




or not a household purchases vaccines (a discrete variable); we hypothesize that these inputs are 
complements with forage from common pastures.  We estimate tropical livestock units and cattle 
separately, since all ruminants can be fed with crop residues and high-value feed, but vaccines 
are purchased only for cattle. 
Below, we first consider household and community characteristics that affect livestock 
production, and consider the likely impact that each variable has on input demands, taking into 
consideration strategic effects as well as whether inputs are gross complements or substitutes in 
production.  Second, we discuss the empirical strategy for recovering estimates of cooperative 
capacity and thus the extent of externalities generated in the use of common pastures.  We then 
derive the equations to be estimated, and present descriptive statistics for the variables used. 
 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
While the main hypothesis to be tested in this paper is the impact of cooperation on 
livestock input demands, clearly other factors will also influence the decision.  Input decisions 
are expected to be a function of a number of household- and community-level variables.  Yet, 
comparative statics are based on the 4x4 matrix for each of two players￿ two input choices; in 
this case, impacts of changes in exogenous variables, other than cooperation, is in general 
ambiguous, and depends on the relative strength of direct vs. strategic impacts.   As long as 



















, then changes in 
certain exogenous variables will have the same impacts as those arising if N=1 (e.g. an increase 
in output price would increase use of all inputs; an increase in the costs of animals would lead to 
                                                                                                                                                             
grain (31 observations) or just stover (39 observations).  Since the number of non-censored observations are quite a 
bit lower, however, explanatory power and efficiency is lower.  Coefficients, however, are similar to those for the 




a decrease in number of animals stocked, an increase low-value substitutes and a decrease in 
high-value complements).  
Consider first the total size of the pasture.  Unfortunately, it is quite possible that the 
allocation of land to common pastures vs. private croplands may itself be a function of 
unobserved community characteristics that may also affect household livestock production 
decisions, leading to potential problems of endogeneity.  Also, given thin and localized markets 
for crop residues with seasonality in demand, we could not recover a community level price for 
crop residues.  Thus, we use the fixed total land endowment at the community-level (cropland 
plus common pastures) to capture both pasture resources and the availability of crop residues.  
We expect that a greater land endowment at the community level will increase stock levels, and 
also lead to greater complementary input use (agro-industrial by-products and vaccines).  The 
impact on crop residues is ambiguous, and depends on whether resulting land allocation patterns 
make pasture or crop by-products less costly.   
The relative price of livestock: grain is used as a measure of the output price relative to 
opportunity costs of increased grain production.  We expect stock levels to increase with higher 
relative livestock prices, and also for purchases of high-value feeds and vaccines to increase.  
Use of crop inputs, however, may well be lower. Distance to the livestock market captures lower 
transactions costs of selling animals, and also lower transactions costs of purchasing feeds and 
potentially vaccines.  Thus, we expect stock levels and purchase of feeds and vaccines to be 
higher, the lower is the distance to market ￿ that is, we expect the direct impact via lower costs 
will outweigh lower marginal returns due to higher stock levels.  Since most crop inputs are 
purchased within the village, we expect no direct impact on these inputs; to the extent that higher 




inputs.  We also expect that the stock of infrastructure within a village ￿ whether or not there is a 
community granary or vaccination park, the numbers of transport vehicles available, etc. ￿ will 
increase all inputs.  This stock of village infrastructure is a simply a sum of all such 
infrastructure found in the community.  The final community-level variable we consider is the 
coefficient of variation in rainfall.  We use secondary data from Hutchinson (2001), and use the 
coefficient of variation instead of the mean and variance of rainfall, since these latter two 
measures are very highly correlated.  We expect that in high rainfall, low variability areas that 
stock densities will be greater, and that purchases of high-valued feeds and vaccines will be 
higher.  We also expect crop inputs to increase since crop yields themselves should be higher and 
less variable in these environments.   
Household-level factors include age of the household head (in natural logarithms), the 
number of adults in the household who have had any public education (either regular schooling 
or adult education classes), whether or not the head of household comes from a traditionally 
pastoralist tribe and the stock of agricultural assets.  It is hypothesized that all four of these 
factors will increase total factor productivity, and thus lead to increased levels of all inputs.   
Given relatively thin agricultural labor markets, household size is expected to capture the 
opportunity costs of agricultural labor.  In the current case, the ￿household￿ was defined by those 
who either shared ownership rights to the household herd and/or were dependent on the 
household head, who is considered the primary herd owner.  To the extent that the (fixed) 
household labor endowment increases the marginal product of all inputs, we expect 
stockholdings and purchased inputs to increase with the stock of labor.  Similarly, total cropland 
under the control of the household is expected to decrease purchase of crop residues; we use total 




many grain storage facilities the household has (only four households have no storage); this 
would decrease the cost of feeding grains and residue to livestock.  We expect such facilities to 
reduce purchase of crop inputs.  On the other hand, we expect that greater cropland and greater 
storage capacity will lead to higher stockholdings and purchases of high-valued feeds, as well as 
the probability of vaccination.  Finally, we consider the ownership structure of the herd.  We 
hypothesize that the greater the proportion of animals owned by the individual (as opposed to 
being part of a share-contract arrangement), the more likely it is that the individual will purchase 
any inputs. We do not include this variable in the stock levels decisions. Descriptive statistics for 


















Table 1￿Descriptive Statistics 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 




Mean tropical livestock units are just over 13, most of which are accounted for by cattle 
holdings; not reported are mean sheep and goat holdings of 6 and 12, respectively.  On average, 
households purchase 28 kgs. of crop input equivalents, though the average for those households 
who purchase these inputs is 178 kgs.  Of the 402 households in the survey, 63 purchase these 
crop inputs.  In fact, many more households purchase high-value feed (204 vs. 63); the average 
 
TLU = tropical livestock units 
Distance to market (km)  
Total cropland per adult  (ha) 
 Dependent  Mean Std.  Minimu Maximu
TLU 13.4 19.0 0.00  157.0
Cattl 11.4 17.9 0.00 149.0
Crop 94.4 416.7 0.00  4800.0
High-Value 228.4 444.4 0.00  3700.0
Vaccine 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Explanatory 
Community -
3262.4 2308.7 586.0 9058.5
2.32 0.15 2.11 2.56
21.1 15.7 0.00 63.0
1.23 1.24 0.00 4.00
0.22 0.02 0.18 0.24
Household-
Age of Household  50.5 15.3 17.0 100.0
Number of Adults with  0.14 0.45 0.00  4.00
Head, Traditionally  0.52 0.50 0.00  1.00
Number of Agricultural  0.22 0.51 0.00  4.00
Number of Household  5.82 3.20 1.00  20.0
Total Cropland per  0.80 0.53 0.00  3.62
Storage 2.14 1.46 0.00  16.0
Proportion Herd  0.90 0.25 0  1
Total Land Endowment 
Price of Cattle:Grain;                           
(kg. Liveweight: kg. 
Distance to Livestock 
Community 




kgs. purchased by those households who purchased any at all is 450 kgs.  Finally nearly 40 
percent of households vaccinated either part or all of their herds.   
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COOPERATION 
In the above theoretical analysis, input decisions are a function of the management of 
common pastures.  While there were no formal rules on livestock levels or pasture use rates in 
the study area, this does not necessarily mean that community members aren￿t aware of pressures 
on the common resource and that informal mechanisms to reduce the tendency to overstock do 
not operate.  In a separate paper, McCarthy et al. (2003) construct two indices of community-
level cooperative capacity, using such variables as the density of community institutions that 
directly engage in natural resource management, the density of other formal organizations, the 
proportion of households participating in these two types of institutions/organizations, the total 
number of rules and activities operating within a community with respect to the natural resource 
base (including water point maintenance, erosion control and reforestation activities, etc.), 
monetary and labor contributions to resource management activities and active participation by 
households at meetings.  A factor analysis of these variables, shown in Appendix 2, yielded two 
factors ￿ one whose scoring coefficients were quite high on organization density and meeting 
participation, and the second whose scoring coefficients were negative for organization density, 
but high on number of rules and activities and active participation by households in terms of 
labor and monetary contributions to local public goods.  We will use these capacity indices in the 
household-level input equations below; and hereafter refer to the first as the index of network 
capacity and the second as the index of implementation capacity, respectively.   These indices 
were then normalized to lie between 0 and 1.  Table 2 below presents descriptive statistics for the 








Full data on all variables is available for 397 of the 402 households.  We observe zero 
values for all of our dependent variables; though 96 percent of observations have TLU > 0,75 
percent (300 households) hold cattle.  Following the Cragg test described in Greene (2000), we 
test whether factors affecting the decision to hold animals are statistically different from those 
affecting the decision on how many animals to hold (e.g. testing the sample selection vs. tobit 
specifications)
 6.  For both TLU and cattle holding, we reject the tobit specification.  We thus use 
two-stage Heckman regressions for the animal holding equations.    Furthermore, purchase of 
feeds will be conditional on holding livestock and purchase of vaccines will be conditional on 
holding cattle.  However, purchases can be zero even when households hold animals.   We use 
the inverse Mills ratio from the TLU Heckman equations to test the tobit vs. sample selection 
specification, and in this case, we accept the tobit model as the appropriate specification
7.    Note 
that, given that purchases themselves are incidentally truncated at zero, we cannot then use a 
standard Heckman for the crop by-product and high-value feed equations.  For vaccines, because 
it is a dichotomous variable, we can run a two-stage Heckman, with probit equations in the first 
stage estimating whether or not the household holds cattle, and the second stage estimating 
                                                 
6 All regressions were performed in STATA 8.0 
7 We actually use the interval regression model to reproduce the tobit specification, but which, using STATA, 
allows us to correct for clustering on community-level variables.   
Cooperation Variables             
    Mean   Std. Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Index of Network Capacity  0.22 0.16 0.00 1.00 





whether or not the household purchases vaccines.  This allows us to adjust errors for both 
selection and clustering.  In this case, we conclude that the equations are in fact independent, and 
present results for the probit on vaccination for the subset of cattle owners. 
Another possible econometric problem concerns potential endogeneity of the cooperative 
capacity indicators with the household input demand equations.  Fortunately, we have available a 
number of potential instruments with which to test endogeneity. In a previous study of 
community-level collective action (McCarthy et al. 2003), the authors regressed the cooperative 
capacity indices on a number of explanatory variables hypothesized to affect collective action in 
found in the general literature on cooperation and resource management
8.   Variables used in that 
analysis included the total number of households and the square of households to test the 
hypothesis that cooperation is more difficult both with few households and with many 
households (Ostrom 1990; de Janvry et al. 1998).   Social heterogeneity, measured by the 
number of quarters within a village and the number of ethnic groups, is expected to reduce 
cooperative capacity since such heterogeneity is posited to make establishing and enforcing 
agreements more costly.   Similarly, the coefficient of variation in cattle holdings ￿ used as a 
proxy wealth differentiation ￿ is expected to decrease cooperative capacity, again because such 
heterogeneity makes negotiating mutually acceptable agreements more difficult.  To capture the 
opportunity costs of engaging in collective action, the authors used the percentage of households 
with at least one member engaged in migration for wage work (Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan 
2002; Bardhan 2000).  The proportion of adults who have attended public school is hypothesized 
to favor cooperative capacity by increasing individuals￿ capacity to acquire information and 
transform such information into practical knowledge.    
                                                 
8 In McCarthy et al. (2003) the authors give a more detailed literature review and of variables hypothesized to affect 




Community-level variables included the coefficient of variation in rainfall, and relative 
livestock:millet prices, distance to market and distance to the regional capital.  The hypothesized 
sign of rainfall variability is ambiguous, whereas more favorable livestock prices and shorter 
distances to market are expected to increase cooperative capacity by increasing returns to 
livestock production, which relies more heavily on common pool resources than does crop 
farming.  Also included was information on the extent to which community resources are shared 
with either neighboring communities, it being hypothesized that resources shared with outsiders 
reduces cooperative capacity by making communication and enforcement more costly. This 
subset of community-level variables, however, enter into the household input decisions, and thus 
cannot serve as instruments. 
Also included were a set of variables capturing the structure of the organizations in the 
community.  Two indicators of the degree of ￿democratization￿ were used, the dominance of the 
village chief￿s role across formal and informal organizations within the community and the 
extent to which other community members participate in rule-making; the hypothesis being that 
democratization increases cooperative capacity.  Finally, information on the presence of external 
programs/projects (mainly international NGO￿s) and the duration of these programs, was 
included to test their impact on cooperative capacity.  The number of programs in existence since 
before 1993 and those beginning after 1993 were included separately.  According to project 
personnel with long experience working in the area, there was a distinct change in the 
development paradigms (Grell, personal communication).  In general, most programs/projects 
beginning before 1993 had an overwhelming focus on technical solutions to crop production and 
NRM, whereas those beginning after 1993 began adopting the ￿terroir￿ approach, with a focus 




those resources, and more recently, considering the pastoral system as a whole, including 
community members￿ use of non-community resources and vice-versa.  It is generally supposed 
that projects begun in the latter period should increase cooperative capacity the most. 
Results of the analysis of factors affecting implementation capacity show that such 
capacity is in areas with higher and less variable rainfall, in communities with less heterogeneity 
in wealth, where fewer people migrated for wage work, where there is more collaboration 
between the chief and community members in rule-making, and where more external projects 
began in the latter period.  These results coincide well with factors expected to positively affect 
collect action for the management of common resources.  On the other hand, network capacity 
was in general higher in areas characterized by lower and more variable rainfall, in communities 
with greater heterogeneity in wealth and ethnicity, where more people migrated for wage work, 
but that were located closer to the regional capital.    This index appears to be capturing the 
capacity of individuals to join networks to exploit potential gains from heterogeneity in terms of 
information flow, increased access to migration networks, and perhaps more importantly, in 
spreading risk.   
For all five household input decisions ￿ total cattle holdings, tropical livestock unit 
holdings, purchases of high-value agro-industrial by-products, purchase of low-value crop by-
products, and purchase of vaccines ￿ we used the instruments identified above to test whether or 
not the cooperative capacity indices were statistically exogenous.  Following the Hausman-Wu 
test, we regress cooperative capacity on all exogenous explanatory variables identified 
immediately above plus the household-level factors expected to affect input demand.  We 
conclude that the indices are indeed statistically exogenous for cattle and livestock holdings, 




exogeneity for implementation capacity in the equation estimating purchase of low-value crop 
by-products.  Thus, we must instrument the implementation capacity index in this regression.  
Below we show results of two specifications.  In the first, we use predicted values of the 
implementation capacity index in a interval regression model correcting for clustering on the 
capacity indices; in this case, we use predicted values of the implementation capacity based on 
regressions found in McCarthy et al. (2003).   Though this specification enables us to correct for 
clustering, it is still inefficient due to the use of the predicted values.  In the second specification, 
we use an instrumental variables tobit, which gives correct standard errors for the instrumented 
variables, but may be inefficient due to the fact that clustering is not taken into account.  As 
shown below, results are quite robust to these alternative specifications. 
INPUT PURCHASE DECISION 
Tables 3 and 4 present results for the two-stage Heckman regressions for livestock 
holdings in tropical livestock units and cattle holdings; *** indicates significant at the 1%, ** at 




Table 3￿Dependent variable, total livestock units; Heckman 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  z-stat 
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)   0.67   1.93   0.35 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist  10.43***   2.20   4.74 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)   7.30***   2.24   3.26 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling  -0.73   0.83  -0.88 
Total Cropland per Household Adult   4.54   2.21   2.05 
# of Agricultural Implements   5.23**   2.31   2.26 
# Crop Storage Facilities   1.46   0.79   1.86 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 







Distance to Market   0.00   0.07   0.06 
Total Land Endowment of Community   0.74   1.39   0.53 








# of Infrastructure in Community  -1.82   1.22  -1.49 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures  -3.25**   1.66  -1.96 
Network Capacity  -2.77   7.04  -0.39 
Implementation Capacity   7.96   5.78   1.38 
Constant   8.05  25.32   0.32 
      
First State       
TLU Holdings (1=positive)       
      
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)  -0.85**  0.35  -2.41 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist  -0.02  0.29  -0.07 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)   0.11**  0.06   1.93 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling  -0.18  0.24  -0.77 
Total Cropland per Household Adult   0.37  0.34   1.12 
# of Agricultural Implements   0.08  0.34   0.24 
# Crop Storage Facilities   0.64***  0.21   3.07 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 







Distance to Market  -0.01   0.01  -1.46 
Total Land Endowment of Community  0.14   0.23   0.58 








# of Infrastructure in Community    0.21**   0.10   1.99 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures    0.11   0.26   0.41 
Network Capacity   0.53   0.73   0.72 
Implementation Capacity  -0.33   0.63  -0.52 
Dummy, Permanent Water Source   0.55**   0.25   2.20 
Constant -0.81    4.20  -0.19 
rho -0.36    0.13  -2.87 
Insigma   2.85   0.12  22.86 
lambda -6.01    2.26   
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho= 0); chi2 (1) = 8.23 Prob>chi2 = 0.0041 
Prob>chi2=.0000 




Table 4￿Dependent variable, cattle-holdings; Heckman 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  z-stat 
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)    2.56    2.45    1.05 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist    8.58***    2.63    3.27 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)    8.00    2.43    3.30 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling   -0.53    0.84   -0.63 
Total Cropland per Household Adult    5.85**    2.72    2.15 
# of Agricultural Implements    1.85    2.03    0.91 
# Crop Storage Facilities    0.73    0.58    1.26 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 







Distance to Market    0.00    0.08   -0.04 
Total Land Endowment of Community    0.51    1.70    0.30 








# of Infrastructure in Community   -0.96    1.30   -0.74 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures   -3.09*    1.92   -1.61 
Network Capacity   -5.45    8.29   -0.66 
Implementation Capacity    4.82    7.58    0.64 
Constant -10.35  28.63    -0.36 
      
Cattle Holdings (1=positive)       
      
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)   -0.59**    0.20   -2.93 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist    0.49    0.19    2.64 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)    0.05    0.05      1.10 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling   -0.07    0.11   -0.65 
Total Cropland per Household Adult    0.01    0.16    0.06 
# of Agricultural Implements    1.09***    0.21    5.14 
# Crop Storage Facilities    0.30    0.09    3.16 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 
Millet in natural logs) 
 
  0.59 
 
  1.64 
 
  0.36 
Distance to Market    0.00    0.01   -0.67 
Total Land Endowment of Community    0.07    0.11    0.62 
Coefficient of Variation of Rainfall (in natural 
logs) 
 
  1.85 
   
  1.16 
 
  1.60 
# of Infrastructure in Community   -0.15**    0.07   -2.29 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures   -0.02    0.12   -0.18 
Network Capacity   -0.09    0.65   -0.14 
Implementation Capacity    0.60    0.39    1.54 
Dummy, Permanent Water Source   -0.02    0.15   -0.12 
Constant    4.01*    2.38    1.68 
rho   -0.28    0.07   -3.85 
Insigma    2.89    0.14   21.85 
lambda   -4.98    1.64   
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho= 0); chi2 (1) = 14.83  Prob>chi2 = 0.0001 
Prob>chi2=.0000 





For both total tropical livestock units and cattle holdings, and for both the discrete 
decision to hold animals as well as how many to hold, the cooperative capacity indices have no 
statistically significant impact.  According to the theory described above, hypothesized impacts 
are ambiguous ￿ though we hypothesized that stock levels would be lower where cooperation is 
higher on the assumption that the marginal impacts of increased stock densities on the livestock 
production would be relatively stronger than marginal impacts of purchased inputs.  The 
ambiguous results also provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that stock levels that are 
either higher or lower than those arising from joint-maximization lead to an overall decline in 
profits
9.    For both cattle and TLU, larger households where the household head comes from a 
traditionally pastoralist tribe hold larger herds, as do those households with more cropland per 
adult located in villages who share pastures with fewer neighboring villages.  For TLU, 
households with more crop storage facilities hold more TLU.  In both cases, age of the household 
head has a negative impact on whether or not to hold TLU or cattle.  Having more agricultural 
assets are increase the probability of having cattle, though, interestingly, village infrastructure 
has a negative impact on the discrete decision to hold cattle.  On the other hand, having access to 
a permanent water source as well as more village infrastructure leads to an increase in the 
probability of holding TLU, so in this case in holding small ruminants.   
In Table 5 below we present the results for the tobit regression of the quantity of agro-
industrial by-products purchased, with errors corrected for clustering on community-level 
variables. 






Table 5￿Dependent Variable, Quality of agro-industrial by-product 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  z-stat 
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)     -35.07  104.65  -0.34 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist   270.18***   88.85   3.04 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)      14.02   15.28   0.92 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling      69.59**   32.22   2.16 
Total Cropland per Household Adult      34.73   69.63   0.50 
# of Agricultural Implements    366.59***   77.06   4.76 
# Crop Storage Facilities      44.57   25.64   1.74 
Proportion of Herd Owned   -191.48   173.61  -1.10 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 
Millet in natural logs) 
 





Distance to Market       3.78      2.54   1.49 
Total Land Endowment of Community    -58.55    56.61  -1.03 








# of Infrastructure in Community    -84.82   59.49  -1.43 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures   -125.21*   76.93  -1.63 
Network Capacity     60.72  257.20   0.24 
Implementation Capacity    315.37*  184.39   1.71 
Inverse Mills Ratio, TLU   -738.68**  330.73  -2.23 
Constant -1640.45*  976.68  -1.68 
      
/Insigma         6.41      0.11  59.00 
 sigma     607.79    66.03   
Prob>chi2=.0000 
Maximum Likelihood R2=.21 
Number of observations=371 
 
 
First, we note that both network and implementation capacity have positive coefficients, 
though only implementation capacity is statistically significant.  Of the household-level 
variables, coefficients are positive and significant for households where the head is traditionally 
pastoralist, where household adults have more education, and where the household holds more 
agricultural assets and crop storage facilities.  The coefficient on the inverse mills ratio is 
negative and significant, implying that errors associated with selecting to hold cattle and the 
purchase decision are negatively correlated. Of the community￿level variables, we note that in 
communities with lower and more variable rainfall, households purchases of high-valued feed 




a greater number of neighboring villages.  Size of the household, age of household head, the 
household￿s land endowment, distances to market and relative livestock prices, and community 
infrastructure have no impact on the purchase decision.  Interestingly, the proportion of the herd 
owned also has no impact on the purchase decision, although we note that in our sample, most 
households owned a very high share of livestock in their herd.  It may be the case that share-
contracts are made between community members, relatives or close friends, such that the moral 
hazard problems associated with lower incentives to invest simply do not arise.  Unfortunately, 
we do not have data to further test whether the relationship with the owner and/or monitoring 
costs for the owner (e.g. if the owner lives in the community or in a distant town) affects this 
choice of additional inputs into livestock production.  Nonetheless, our results do not support the 
contention that such contracting arrangements reduce purchase of high-value feeds.  To 
summarize, purchase of high-value feeds is greater in communities with better agro-climatic 
conditions, where common pastures are shared with fewer neighbors and where cooperative 
capacity is high, and in households wealthier in terms of agricultural assets and human capital, 
and where the ethnicity of the household head is traditionally pastoralist. 
In Tables 6a and 6b below, we present the results for the purchase of low-value crop-




Table 6a￿Dependent variable, quantity of crop by-products purchased; Tobit 
specification using predicted cooperative capacity indices 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  z-stat 
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)      237.84   237.87   1.00 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist        -6.65   206.31  -0.03 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)      -71.57**    32.62  -2.19 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling      119.42   100.32   1.19 
Total Cropland per Household Adult      -37.92   144.23  -0.26 
# of Agricultural Implements       -9.07   184.76  -0.05 
# Crop Storage Facilities     218.78**    73.24   2.99 
Proportion of Herd Owned    -291.28   306.47  -0.95 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 







Distance to Market     -26.93***     10.15  -2.65 
Total Land Endowment of Community     -29.79   135.83  -0.22 








# of Infrastructure in Community       30.78     94.94   0.32 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures    -221.50   144.20  -1.54 
Network Capacity    -289.35   476.10  -0.61 
Implementation Capacity  -1047.20   657.03  -1.59 
Inverse Mills Ratio, TLU  -2380.09*  1307.60  -1.82 
Constant -6810.93**  2694.74  -2.53 
      
/Insigma         7.11       0.20  35.89 
 sigma   1224.76    242.65   
Prob>chi2=.0001 
Maximum Likelihood R2=.10 




Table 6b￿Dependent variable, quantity of crop by-products purchased; Instrumenting for 
capacity indices 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  z-stat 
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)      255.49   333.90   0.68 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist        54.91   232.46   0.24 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)      -66.40    44.57  -1.49 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling      135.39   126.07   1.07 
Total Cropland per Household Adult      -73.03   193.96  -0.38 
# of Agricultural Implements      -45.61   199.89  -0.23 
# Crop Storage Facilities     228.33**    82.55   2.77 
Proportion of Herd Owned    -331.29   379.55  -0.87 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 
Millet in natural logs) 
 





Distance to Market      -29.19***       9.63  -3.03 
Total Land Endowment of Community         8.79   168.79   0.05 








# of Infrastructure in Community    102.45   111.23   0.92 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures   -297.02**   165.14  -1.80 
Network Capacity   -277.65   645.58  -0.43 
Implementation Capacity  -1886.74**   973.34  -1.94 
Inverse Mills Ratio, TLU -2113.50**  1103.65  -1.92 
Constant -7388.47**  3013.92  -2.45 
Prob>chi2=.0001 




   As shown in Tables 6a and 6b, the cooperative capacity indices are negative as expected, 
but network capacity is never significant.  In the first specification which uses predicted values 
for implementation capacity, the coefficient is just shy of significance at the 10 percent level; the 
coefficient is negative and significant in the instrumental variables equation shown in 6b.  Of the 
household-level variables, household size is positive and significant in the first specification, and 
crop storage facilities are positive and significant in both specifications, both as expected.  In an 
interesting contrast with purchase of high-value feed, higher livestock prices and lower distances 
to market both contribute to higher household purchases of crop-based feeds.  Certainly a 
positive sign on the relative livestock: grain price coefficient is expected ￿ since this indicates 
both higher output price and lower input costs.  However, a priori, we assumed that distance to 
market would be more important not only for sales of livestock products, but also for purchase of 
high-valued feed and vaccines, but less important for grain and crop residues, since the market 
for residues in particular tend to be more localized due to the low feed value but relative 
bulkiness.  Neither cropland per household nor total land endowment at the community level 
affect purchase of these feeds.  Sharing pastures with neighbors is negative in both equations, as 
is the case with purchase of high-value feeds.  This effect likely comes from the negative impact 
on livestock and cattle holdings indicated in Tables 3 and 4.   The impact of the coefficient of 
variation of rainfall is again negative, as in the high-value feeds equation, though it is not 
significant in either equations.  To summarize purchase of low value crop-based feeds are higher 
in communities with low implementation capacity facing high livestock prices relative to grain 
prices, and for households with greater storage capacity. 






Table 7￿Dependent variable, purchase of vaccines; probit 
  Coefficient Std.  Error  z-stat 
Age, Household Head (in natural logs)  -0.053  0.26    -0.2 
Head ￿ Ethnicity, Pastoralist  -0.157  0.21  -0.77 
# of Adults in HH, (in natural logs)   0.125  0.20   0.63 
# of Adults, Public or Adult Schooling   0.001  0.09   0.01 
Total Cropland per Household Adult   0.115  0.16   0.74 
# of Agricultural Implements   0.244*  0.14   1.78 
# Crop Storage Facilities   0.148**  0.07   2.02 
Proportion of Herd Owned   0.003  0.26   0.01 
Price of Livestock: Millet (kg. Liveweight: kg. 







Distance to Market  -0.001  0.01  -0.13 
Total Land Endowment of Community  -0.022  0.14  -0.16 








# of Infrastructure in Community   0.063  0.11   0.58 
# of Neighbors Sharing Pastures  -0.281  0.14  -2.01 
Network Capacity  -0.322  0.52  -0.62 
Implementation Capacity   0.176  0.45   0.39 
Constant 04.996**  2.53  -1.97 
Prob>chi2=.0000 
Maximum Likelihood R2=.10 
Number of Observations = 296 
 
As noted above, we conclude that the decision to purchase vaccines is independent of the 
decision to hold animals.  First we note that neither cooperative capacity index is statistically 
significant in this equation.  Households with more agricultural assets and storage facilities are 
more likely to purchase vaccines, as are those living in communities with higher relative 
livestock:grain prices and where there are fewer neighbors sharing pastures.  Interestingly, 
community infrastructure is not significant ￿ if we substitute infrastructure with a variable that 
takes the value of one if the community has a vaccination park, results are quite similar. 
In summary, econometric results are consistent with the hypothesis that substitute inputs, 
such crop-based feeds, are more likely to be purchased by households located in communities 
with less cooperative capacity; whereas evidence for one of the complementary inputs, high-
valued feeds, is more likely to be purchased where cooperative capacity is higher.  Household 




input; whereas own cropland only increases livestock holdings.  Whether or not the household 
head comes from a traditionally pastoralist group ￿ used to proxy experience and knowledge of 
livestock production ￿ leads to greater stock levels and also higher purchases of high-value 
feeds, with no impact on the purchase of crop-based feeds or vaccines.  Education levels within 
the household have a positive impact on purchase of high-quality feeds.  Thus, it appears that 
wealthier households ￿ in terms of human and physical capital ￿ not only hold more animals, but 
also are more likely to purchase additional inputs ￿ either low-value feeds, high-value feeds, or 
vaccines.  Communities facing higher and more variable rainfall are less likely to buy any inputs 
￿ though, while the coefficient is consistently negative, it is only significant for high-value feeds.  
Finally, relative market prices and distances to markets do not affect either livestock holdings or 
purchased inputs, save for the crop-based feeds. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper uses data collected in northeastern Burkina Faso, and we can compare the 
results obtained here with other analyses of the same dataset.  For instance, McCarthy (2003) 
investigates the impact of cooperative capacity, using the same indicators used in the above 
analysis, on stock densities, herd mobility and lands allocated to common pasture.  Network 
capacity had no statistically significant impact on any of the endogenous variables, but higher 
implementation capacity led to lower stock densities, greater herd mobility (which also relieves 
pressure on community-based pastures), and to more lands being allocated to common pastures 
vs. individually cropped fields.  Dutilly-Diane et al. (2002) also used the same data set and 
indicators on cooperative capacity to estimate total household income, total livestock, crop, and 




non-farm income.  The results show that implementation capacity increases livestock income, the 
share of livestock income and total incomes, whereas network capacity leads to higher crop and 
non-farm income, but no change in total incomes. The results of this study is consistent the 
results from both the McCarthy (2003) and Dutilly-Diane et al. (2002) studies ￿ implementation 
capacity is associated with lower purchases of low-value substitutes (the need for which should 
be lower where common pastures are better managed, all else equal), and higher purchases of 
high-value complements to common pasture, but network capacity has no statistically significant 
impact on any household-level input decisions. 
The paper is of direct policy relevance for a number of reasons.  The goals of the new 
resource management and land use laws is to devolve both rights and responsibilities for NRM to 
the community level, with the objective of promoting efficient and sustainable resource use in 
order to alleviate poverty and to reduce the vulnerability of rural households to income 
fluctuations. Given the continual increase in population pressure and increased sedentarization of 
the pastoral population, it is strongly felt that intensification of both crop and livestock 
production must occur in order for households to lift themselves out of poverty.   At the same 
time, the impact of resource management at the community level on the household level decision 
to intensify production via private inputs has been nearly completely neglected.    
Empirical results from this study indicate that in communities with better managed 
natural resources, including common pastures, households are more likely to purchase high-
value feeds.  On the other hand, households in villages with poorly managed pastures have a 
greater probability of purchasing low-value crop residue, a substitute for forage.  As noted 
above, Dutilly-Diane et al. (2002) show that households in villages with poorly managed 




far-reaching.  Policies and projects that promote intensification of livestock production are quite 
likely to fail in non-cooperative communities simply because the marginal returns to adopting 
high-value inputs will be much lower in areas where ranges are overstocked.  Instead, 
households will spend their money on purchasing substitute feeds.  In well-managed 
communities, however, adoption of high-value products is likely to be successful.   
There is no reason to suppose that the difference between adopters and non-adopters is a 
function of whether or not pastures are held in common (the property rights structure) per se, but 
rather how well-managed are the common lands.   There are many benefits associated with 
common pastures that are lost under individual privatization, perhaps the most important being 
the reduction in spatial and temporal variation in forage (due to fluctuating rainfall, for instance).  
Reduced access to grazing resources increases riskiness of production, which in turn is likely to 
lead to lower purchase of inputs.  In such semi-arid environments, then, promoting technology 
adoption may well begin with promoting collective action.  
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APPENDIX 1--COOPERATIVE CAPACITY AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL, AND ITS 
DETERMINANTS 
 




    
Network NRM  0.241 -0.065
Membership NRM  0.355 0.087
Network others   0.300 -0.291
Membership others  0.168 -0.175
# Meetings  0.032 0.071
# Activities  0.058 0.207
# Rules  -0.013 0.101
Participation in meetings  0.028 0.091
Participation in work  0.132 0.422
# Days of work  0.087 0.223
 




Table A2--Determinants of Cooperative Capacity 
   Network Capacity     
Active 
Capacity   
  Coef. t-stat      Coef. t-stat   
Demographic       
Size community  -4.77 -2.97**   1.35 0.65   
Size community sq.  0.01 2.43**   0.00 -0.27   
# Quarters  33.68 2.18**   8.23 0.48   
# Ethnic groups  -7.35 -0.44    32.47 1.22   
Heterogeneity in cattle holding  16.38 3.27**    -15.66 -1.89 * 
% Adults migrating  578.05 1.30     -1083.70 -2.19 * 
% Households w/ public education  325.47 1.91*   404.69 1.37     
Institutions structure            
Chief Dominant  25.09 0.45    -5.46 -0.08  
% rules made in collaboration  276.41 3.11**   10.41 0.04   
# Projects             
Before 1986  37.65 2.22**   -6.91 -0.26   
1986-1993 (Terroir approach)  23.35 1.27    98.59 3.81 ** 
1993-2001 (NRM approach)  29.77 0.89    80.45 1.67 * 
Distance to regional capital  -0.03 -2.16**   -0.03 -0.99   
External pressure             
# Village sharing past.  5.16 0.14    -65.89 -0.94  
Transhumants using past.  -29.23 -0.54    179.08 1.48   
Market and Agro-Ecological              
Relative Livestock:Grain Price  -50.49 -0.12    474.88 0.84  
Distance to Livestock Market  -6.49 -0.30    20.06 0.82  
Coefficient of Variation, Rainfall  524.14 1.73*    -734.04 -1.89 * 
Constant  1141.13 2.18**      -1277.14 -1.83 * 
Number of observations  48    48  
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